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THE PROTECTION OF FREE CHOICE AND THE RIGHT
TO PASSIVITY: APPLYING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION TO PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
AND DOCUMENTS’ SUBMISSION
Rinat Kitai-Sangero*

ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the question of whether the privilege against selfincrimination should cover physical examinations as well as the obligation to submit
documents. This question requires a serious examination of the justifications underlying the privilege against self-incrimination and is of particular relevance in the current
age of technological progress that expands the powers assigned to law enforcement
agencies to access knowledge and thoughts stored in individuals’ minds. After addressing the comparative law regarding the applicability of the privilege against selfincrimination to physical examinations and to the obligation to submit documents
and discussing key justifications for the privilege against self-incrimination, dividing
them into epistemic and non-epistemic, and examining in that light whether there
is a valid distinction between compelled speech and compelled physical examinations
and documents’ submission, the Article concludes that extending the privilege against
self-incrimination to physical examinations and to the obligation to submit documents
is necessary to protect accused persons’ free will to choose their defense strategy given
the burden imposed on the state to prove guilt as a condition for securing convictions.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the question of whether the privilege against self-incrimination should cover physical examinations as well as the obligation to hand over
documents. This question requires a serious examination of the justifications
underlying the privilege against self-incrimination and is of particular relevance in
the current age of technological transformations that expand the powers assigned to
law enforcement agencies to access knowledge and thoughts stored in individuals’
minds. Thus, it is not inconceivable that brain imaging techniques that examine
mental activity could trace thoughts and memories of silent suspects or determine
the reliability of their version of events.1 In India, for example, several defendants
have been convicted of murder based on brain imaging devices.2
1

See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of Mind Reading, 15 YALE J.L.&TECH.
214, 216 (2013). For a description of existing brain imaging and information-extraction
techniques, see Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 368–77
(2012); Erin B. Pulice, The Right to Silence at Risk: Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection in
the United Kingdom, India, and the United States, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 865,
869–76 (2010); Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie
Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED., 359, 360–64 (2007).
2
Pulice, supra note 1, at 866, 876 (referring to a technique known as a Brain Electrical
Oscillation Signature profiling).
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The protection from searches of individuals’ bodies, homes, and effects is a constitutional right stemming from the right to human dignity.3 Searches by law enforcement
agencies might violate human needs for a safe place in the world.4 They can infringe
on individuals’ privacy, autonomy, and physical integrity.5 Searches can reveal intimate
details6 and violate property rights.7 The fear of such results might inhibit individuals’
work and impair their freedom of expression.8 It is no wonder, therefore, that searches
might cause anxiety, humiliation, and anger.9 Their expected harms must restrict the
state’s power to search the bodies and the belongings of accused persons and to
oblige the submission of documents.10
While some apply the privilege against self-incrimination to personal documents
such as a diary and equate them with thoughts, the common perception is that seizing
3

See DAVID FELDMAN, THE LAW RELATING TO ENTRY, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1 (1986).
Id. at 2.
5
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52
(1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); FELDMAN, supra note 3, § 1.01;
William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1232–34 (1988).
6
Susan M. Easton, Bodily Samples and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, CRIM. L.
REV. 18, 27 (1991) (discussing an example of biological paternity disclosed through DNA tests).
7
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
8
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Note, The
Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v.
United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683, 695–97 (1982).
9
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25 (citing anxiety, embarrassment, and anger as logical reasons
to refuse a search); FELDMAN, supra note 3, § 1.02 (referring to the invasion of a person’s home);
see also Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 344–45 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (referring to an external examination of the naked body). For a more artful take
on this sense of what a search can do, see FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS
KARAMAZOV 681 (Constance Garnett trans., Lerner Publishing Group 2015) (1880) (“It was
a misery to him to take off his socks. They were very dirty, and so were his underclothes, and
now everyone could see it. And what was worse, he disliked his feet. All his life he had
thought both his big toes hideous. He particularly loathed the coarse, flat, crooked nail on the
right one, and now they would all see it.”).
10
See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 214 (1988) (acknowledging the existence of
suspects’ constitutional protections against compulsory cooperation in investigations, even
without applying the privilege against self-incrimination); P.J. FITZGERALD, CRIMINAL LAW
AND PUNISHMENT 177 (1962); Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 920 (1995) (stating that
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution should protect suspects
from unreasonable body searches and from requirements to hand over documents); James A.
McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth
Amendment, 53 IND.L.J. 55, 70 (1977) (stating that the Fourth Amendment should offer special
protection of private documents). In England, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984)
distinguishes between a non-intimate search, which allows the use of force, and an intimate
search, which does not. See generally Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60 (Eng.)
(describing many separate privileges that individuals under arrest have across multiple
sections); see also SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 213–16 (1998).
4
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documents during a lawful search violates values such as privacy, but not selfincrimination.11 This Article does not deal with a seizure of documents during lawful
searches, but rather explores whether the privilege against self-incrimination should
offer accused persons protection against the obligation to endure physical examinations and to hand over documents to law enforcement agencies.
The justifications for the privilege against self-incrimination and the requirement to make voluntary confessions are crudely divided into epistemic justifications,
which concern the reliability of evidence, and non-epistemic justifications, which aim
at the promotion of values other than the pursuit of truth, chiefly the right to autonomy
and the need to deter police from employing oppressive techniques of investigation.12
Non-epistemic justifications serve as reasons for excluding involuntary yet trustworthy confessions, such as confessions obtained through torture, in the wake of which
suspects point to the location of the victim’s body or the proceeds of the robbery.13
A central justification for the privilege against self-incrimination, which is based
on both epistemic and non-epistemic reasons, addresses the burden imposed on the
state to prove guilt.14 The state creates rivalry with suspects and defendants during
the investigatory and trial phases, accusing them of undermining the possibility to
establish a partnership within a regime of a state. In a rivalry, the state cannot turn
suspects and defendants into accusers. It must find the evidence of guilt through its
own independent efforts. Accused persons need to prove nothing and may rely on
weaknesses in the prosecution’s case in their defense. This justification, combined
with the inhibition of accused persons’ free choice and with the right of individuals
to maintain their autonomy in the face of the governmental power, should lead to
applying the privilege against self-incrimination to physical examinations and documents’ submission. In fact, the privilege against self-incrimination does not protect
the content of the information stored in our minds per se. Thus, voluntary statements
and confessions as well as verbal exchanges obtained by lawful eavesdropping are
admissible evidence at trial. The privilege against self-incrimination does, however,
protect the integrity of accused persons’ free will to avoid cooperating with law
enforcement agencies regarding the blame attributed to them.
Part I addresses the comparative law regarding the applicability of the privilege
against self-incrimination to physical examinations and to the obligation to submit
11

See, e.g., Constantine Theophilopoulos, Self-Incrimination, Private Records, and
Required Reporting in Regulatory Statutes, 131 S.AFR.L.J. 604, 610 (2014). However, various
courts in the United States have reached different conclusions on this issue. Farahany, supra
note 1, at 387.
12
ANDREW L-T CHOO, THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 3–10 (2013); D.J. Galligan, The Right to Silence Reconsidered, 41 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 69, 71–73, 84 (1988).
13
See Ian Dennis, The Human Rights Act and the Law of Criminal Evidence: Ten Years
On, 33 SYDNEY L.REV. 333, 350–51 (2011); see also PETER MIRFIELD, SILENCE,CONFESSIONS
AND IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 13 (1997).
14
E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
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documents.15 The lack of consensus on the applicability of the privilege to physical
examinations and submission of documents demonstrates the current lack of clarity
regarding the predominant justifications underlying the privilege. Part II discusses key
justifications for the privilege against self-incrimination, dividing them into epistemic
and non-epistemic, and examines whether there is a distinction between compelled
speech, compelled physical examinations, and a compulsion to submit documents.16
The Article concludes that extending the privilege against self-incrimination to physical
examinations and to the obligation to submit documents is necessary to protect accused persons’ free will to choose their defense strategy given the burden imposed
on the state to prove their guilt as a condition for securing convictions.
I. COMPARATIVE LAW REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION TO PHYSICAL
EXAMINATIONS AND DOCUMENTS’ SUBMISSION
A. United States
In Schmerber v. California, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a 5–4
decision that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial evidence and does not protect suspects from physical examinations and searches.17 The
Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not preclude
the introducing of the lab results of a blood sample taken from a defendant while
hospitalized in an unconscious state following a traffic accident into evidence of a
DUI offence at trial.18
In its narrow construction of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Supreme
Court relied on the traditional version of the historical development of the privilege,
which views it as a protection against unreliable evidence.19 The dissenters in the
Schmerber case, however, held that a broad application of the privilege to searches
of a person’s body is necessary to prevent the abuse of governmental power, to protect
the sanctity of a mental freedom, and to compel the state to find evidence against a
person through its own efforts, based on the presumption of innocence.20
In this regard, it should also be noted that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of comparing a DNA sample taken from serious felony detainees with the
DNA samples in the police database in such a way that a random comparison could
15

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
17
384 U.S. 757, 761, 763–64 (1966).
18
Id. at 758, 761, 765.
19
See id. at 762–63.
20
Id. at 775–78 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 778–79 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 779
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
16
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tie detainees to the commission of additional offenses, other than that attributed to
them in the first place.21
The Supreme Court reiterated that the word “witness” in the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution restricts the prohibition on coerced self-incrimination to communication, which directly or indirectly relates to fact or belief, and is expressed verbally
in words or non-verbally in body language such as shaking the head, rather than in
the presentation of physical characteristics which might incriminate the individual,
such as wearing a shirt or providing samples of blood, handwriting or voice.22
The Court further clarified that the privilege against self-incrimination does not
protect accused persons from being compelled to actively cooperate with law enforcement agencies by, for example, providing written exemplars or participating in
a lineup.23 Thus, for example, the Court held that compelling a suspect to participate
in a line up, to put strips of tape on his face, and to utter certain words does not infringe
on the privilege against self-incrimination because it constitutes a compulsion to exhibit
his physical characteristics and not to disclose information in his possession.24
However, some states in the United States provide a broader protection against
compelled self-incrimination than the Federal Constitution, and their constitutions
explicitly prohibit the compulsion of a person to provide evidence against himself.25
Courts in these states have distinguished between actions that require active cooperation on the part of accused persons and actions that can be performed without cooperation on their part and require them only to avoid resisting it.26 Actions such as taking
fingerprints or hair samples from suspects are not included in the ambit of the privilege
because they do not require active cooperation.27 Moreover, the privilege does not
protect accused persons from extreme intrusions of their body, such as surgery to remove a bullet, which involves penetrating the skin.28 Thus, for example, the Georgia
Supreme Court has allowed a compelled surgery involving local anesthesia to remove
a bullet from a defendant who was charged with double homicide for its comparison
21

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013).
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764; accord United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–35
(2000); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210, 215 (1988).
23
See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410
U.S. 19, 22 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967).
24
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220–23 (1967).
25
See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 16 (“No person shall be compelled to give testimony
tending in any manner to be self-incriminating.”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.”).
26
See, e.g., State v. Armstead, 262 S.E.2d 233, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
27
Id. (stating that “[t]he distinction is between forcing an accused to do an act against his
will and requiring an accused to submit to an act”); Creamer v. State, 192 S.E.2d 350, 354
(Ga. 1972); Weaver v. State, 288 S.E.2d 687, 688 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Van Dam,
554 P.2d 1324, 1325 (Utah 1976).
28
See, e.g., Creamer, 192 S.E.2d at 353.
22
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with a bullet allegedly fired by the victim.29 The court asserted that the surgery did
not infringe on the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination since it did not
require the suspect to actively cooperate by removing the bullet from his body on
his own.30 In Winston v. Lee, the United States Supreme Court did not permit a surgery for removing a bullet from the chest area of a suspect in an attempted robbery
in order to compare the bullet to a bullet fired by the victim at the perpetrator.31 The
Supreme Court held that a surgery that involved general anesthesia, the risks of which
were disputed but apparently not extremely severe, was an unreasonable search.32
Going along with the logic outlined in the Schmerber case, the Supreme Court
analyzed the reasonability of the search without addressing the privilege against
self-incrimination.33
In an early ruling regarding the applicability of the privilege against selfincrimination to the obligation to submit documents, the Supreme Court in Boyd v.
United States considered the privilege as also protecting from the mere seizure of
documents.34 In Boyd, the defendants were given permission to import custom-free
plate glass in the amount required to execute their construction contract with the state.35
The state’s suspicion regarding the defendants arose when they imported a second
shipment of custom-free plate glass, claiming that the glass was broken during the first
shipment.36 At the state’s request, a federal court compelled the defendants to furnish the invoice for the first shipment, assuming that this invoice would prove or
disprove the credibility of the defendants’ claim regarding the damage that occurred
to the glass.37 The Supreme Court reversed this order, asserting that there is no distinction between submitted documents and documents seized through a legal search.38
Such a search is protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution as being
unreasonable in light of the defendants’ proprietary rights in the invoice.39 The Court
added that the seizure of documents also violates the Fifth Amendment because it
turns a person into a witness against himself.40
On another occasion, the Supreme Court reiterated the notion that the privilege
against self-incrimination as well as the constitutional right against unreasonable
29

Id. at 351–52, 355.
Id. at 354.
31
470 U.S. 753 (1985). Winston was convicted at his trial based on the rest of the evidence
against him. Ronald J. Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, but Opening Old Wounds in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 624 n.188 (1986).
32
Winston, 470 U.S. at 766.
33
Id. at 758–60.
34
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1886).
35
Id. at 618.
36
Id. at 617–18.
37
Id. at 618–19.
38
Id. at 621–22.
39
Id. at 624–25, 627–28.
40
Id. at 633–35.
30
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searches protect persons from introducing documents seized through a search warrant
or during arrest, in which they have lawful proprietary rights, as evidence against them
at trial.41 This ruling, which hindered the gathering of documents in the possession
of accused persons for evidentiary purposes during criminal investigations, severely
handicapped law enforcement.42 It is no wonder, then, that it could not have survived
for long.43 Initially, the Supreme Court clarified that the rule does not apply to items
used for committing offenses and to items that are the proceeds of offenses committed.44 Later, the Court ruled that items such as clothes could be seized through a
lawful search for evidentiary purposes45 because their seizure lacks any communicative nature and therefore does not compel persons to testify against themselves.46 In
addition, such searches and seizures are not unreasonable since the main purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect privacy rather than property.47 In another case, the
Supreme Court asserted that a search during which private, voluntarily made business
records were taken from a suspect in fraudulent offenses does not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination, because the suspect is required to say or to do nothing and
is not obliged to aid in the disclosure, production, or validation of the documents.48
The Supreme Court further made it clear that when the incriminating documents are
taken from a third party in a manner that the documents’ owner is required to do
nothing, the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked.49
Documents that are records required by law are generally not protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination.50 The law may instruct a recordkeeping for
regulatory purposes.51 Such customarily produced documents are akin to public
records.52 Thus, for example, some have argued that, given the states’ taxing power,
Boyd could have been required to keep the receipt of the glass shipment.53 However,
41

Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309–11 (1921).
James M. Shellow, The Continuing Vitality of the Gouled Rule: The Search for and
Seizure of Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 175 (1964); see Craig M. Bradley, Constitutional
Protection for Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 466–68 (1981).
43
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Justice O’Connor even went so far
as to state that “our decision in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), sounded the death
knell for Boyd.” United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
44
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
45
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300–01, 306–07, 310 (1967).
46
Id. at 302–03.
47
Id. at 304.
48
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473–74 (1976).
49
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 325, 335–36 (1973); Johnson v. United States,
228 U.S. 457, 459 (1913).
50
See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 15 (1948).
51
See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 74 (1968).
52
See id. at 68.
53
E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Entick v. Carrington and Boyd v. United States: Keeping the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment on Track, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 27, 45–46 (2015).
42
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the state has no unfettered power to require its citizens to keep records that violate
their privacy.54 Also, the law cannot order the keeping of incriminating records per
se so that the very compliance with the order constitutes proof of guilt.55 In general,
the Supreme Court ruled out the categorization of people inherently suspect of illegal
activities for the purpose of keeping records.56 Accordingly, the Court held that a law
requiring members of the Communist Party to notify the authorities of their membership violates the privilege against self-incrimination because it refers to members
of a predefined group that is inherently suspect of criminal activities.57 Similarly,
defendants may assert the privilege against self-incrimination when they fail to
comply with a law that requires them to pay taxes for gambling and engaging in the
business of accepting wagers and to be registering as dealing in gambling,58 or as
firearm traders.59 The Court also held that persons involved in a trade of legal marijuana should not be subject to a specific tax ordinance related to dealing in marijuana because that might reveal criminal offenses committed before the said persons
obtained a legal license to deal in marijuana.60 Hence, the Supreme Court examined
whether the purpose served by the law is intrinsically regulatory, while the generality of the law directed at the public at large is an indication of its regulatory purpose,
whereas its confining to a specific group inherently suspect of criminal activities
casts doubt on its purpose.61
In addition, the Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination
does not protect persons from the obligation to submit voluntarily prepared private
documents.62 Although the Court protected the admission involved in the very
submission of the documents, it abandoned the idea that the privilege against selfincrimination precludes the submission of documents that contain incriminating
material.63 The Court asserted that the mere submission of the requested documents
conveys a testimonial message according to which the documents exists, are in the
possession or control of the accused, and are indeed the documents requested.64
Under certain circumstances, where the very submission of documents is of independent evidentiary value, a person required to hand over a document cannot assert
54

Robert B. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193,

217.
55

See Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 97 n.11 (1968).
See Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
57
Id. at 78–79.
58
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 41–42, 44 (1968); Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62, 63–64 (1968).
59
Haynes, 390 U.S. at 87, 98–99.
60
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 26 (1969).
61
See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1970).
62
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610–12 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 423 (1976).
63
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399–400.
64
Id. at 410.
56
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the privilege against self-incrimination in relation to the content of the documents
but may invoke it regarding the very act of submission.65 In such cases, persons
cannot be required to hand over documents without a grant of immunity against the
incriminating meanings flowing from the submission.66 Thus, officials in corporations enjoy the protection of the privilege as to the fact that they are the ones who
submit the documents on behalf of the corporation and thus demonstrate knowledge
regarding the existence and location of the requested documents.67
As noted above, however, the Supreme Court declined to apply the protection
of the privilege against self-incrimination to the requirement to hand over voluntarily prepared documents.68 In the case of Fisher, whose attorneys were required to
furnish documents to the tax authorities prepared by accountants and provided to the
attorneys by Fisher, the Court emphasized that the privilege against self-incrimination
did not apply because the taxpayer was not required to verify the authenticity of the
documents, and the existence and location of the documents were already known to
the authorities, so that the mere handing over of the documents disclosed no new
information.69 In another case, the Supreme Court held that a suspect may be required to sign consent forms that allow the relevant bank to disclose information on
bank accounts controlled by the suspect.70
United States v. Hubbell expanded the applicability of the privilege against selfincrimination to some aspects of the requirement of submission of documents.71
Webster Hubbell was indicted for wire and tax fraud.72 He pleaded guilty as part of
a plea bargain and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment.73 Under the plea bargain, Hubbell undertook to cooperate in a particular investigation.74 While in prison,
Hubbell received a summons to appear before the grand jury in Little Rock, Arkansas,
and to submit documents according to eleven specific categories.75 After Hubbell
argued that the mere submission might imply that the documents were in his possession or control and consequently might incriminate him, the prosecution granted him
production immunity.76 After receiving the immunity, Hubbell handed over more
than 13,000 pages, stating that these documents correspond to the description of the
documents contained in the warrant, and that he provided all the documents in his
possession or control, except for documents protected by attorney-client privilege
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
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Doe, 465 U.S. at 612.
Id. at 617.
MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE 190 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 423.
Id. at 411–13.
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988).
530 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2000).
Id. at 31.
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and documents that had been prepared for trial.77 Based on the contents of the documents furnished, Hubbell was indicted on another wire and tax fraud charge.78 The
special prosecutor admitted he did not suspect Hubbell’s offenses when he first
requested the documents.79 Hubbell pleaded guilty, subject to judicial determination
concerning his claim of the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination
to the documents he submitted.80
The Supreme Court held that using the documents against their provider is
unacceptable under the circumstances of the case.81 It asserted that the catalog of
documents for each of the eleven categories reached the prosecutor through the
defendant’s mental efforts, and that furnishing such a catalog is more akin to the
submission of a code to a safe than just giving its key.82 The testimonial value of
furnishing a catalog of existing documents, regardless of their contents, is protected
by the privilege against self-incrimination.83 In this case, the first evidence in the
evidentiary chain that led to the conviction was provided by the defendant, and the
documents did not just appear in the prosecutor’s office as “manna from heaven.”84
While in the Fisher case, the prosecution already knew about the existence of the
documents and their being in the lawyers’ possession, and was able to independently
confirm their authenticity through the accountants who created them,85 in the Hubbell
case, the prosecution failed to establish that it had prior knowledge of the existence
or whereabouts of more than 13,000 document pages submitted by the defendant.86
The prosecution cannot remedy this deficiency by claiming that it stands to reason
that businessmen like the defendant customarily keep business and tax records that
fall under the broad categories described in the warrant.87 In fact, without possessing
knowledge about specific documents, the absence of which can be discerned from
the fact that the prosecution pointed to categories of documents rather than to specific documents, the submission of the documents does carry testimonial value.88
Persons should not therefore be forced to hand over such documents without a grant
of immunity.89
77
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B. Israel
In Israel, the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to physical examinations and to placing suspects in a lineup.90 In the Khoury case, the Israeli Supreme
Court discussed a defendant’s refusal to dip his hands in a chemical that reveals traces
of drugs and affirmed the possibility of drawing adverse inferences from his refusal.91 The Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination protects only the
compelled submission of evidence in a manner akin to the transmission of testimony
but not the right against physical examinations.92
In the Yefet case, the Supreme Court distinguished between documents presented to a governmental inquiry committee that were created especially for the
committee and existing documents made independently of the committee’s work,
holding that the prosecution is disallowed to introduce as evidence at trial only the
first type of documents.93
The Lagziel case presented a rather comical situation.94 The prosecution had lost
its trial file and asked the defense counsel to provide his copy of the file that the
prosecution gave him before the trial as part of its duty of disclosure.95 The defense
counsel declined the prosecution’s request, asserting that handing over the file to the
prosecution in order to pursue the case against his client violated his privilege against
self-incrimination.96 The Supreme Court, however, compelled the defense counsel
to submit the file to the prosecution, stating that the file actually contains material
that basically belongs to the prosecution, not to the defendant.97 Justice StrasbergCohen distinguished between private documents, which are the product of the individual’s mind and creation, and public documents.98 In fact, in the Lagziel case, there
was indeed no attempt by the prosecution to compel the defendant to furnish evidence
that it could not have obtained through its independent efforts, since the prosecution
itself had given the file to the defendant.99
As to records kept by citizens according to the law, the Israeli Supreme Court
held they are not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.100 Documents
90

CrimA 663/81 Khoury v. State of Israel, 85(2) PD 85, 92 (1982) (Isr.); CrimA 648/77
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that are required to be submitted by statutes are not private, and the public interest
to use them overcomes the private interests of the documents’ owners to avoid
disclosing them.101
Thus, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected the invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination by milk producers, who declined to submit documents regarding
the quotas of milk production and marketing to the Agricultural Supervisory Authority
(ASA) as required by the Agricultural Supervisory Authority Law of 1988.102 The
Court held that specific laws override the privilege, and that ASA may claim such documents because the producers have a statutory obligation to file them for inspection.103
In that case, although the ASA undertook to refrain from using the documents in
criminal proceedings, the Court did not base its decision on this commitment and
rejected the argument according to which ASA could use the documents so obtained
only to impose administrative sanctions but not as evidence at trial.104
The question of whether suspects may be required to furnish to law enforcement
agencies documents that the law does not instruct them to file was decided in the
Gilad Sharon case.105 Sharon was suspected of bribery and violation of the Political
Parties Financing Law.106 It should be noted at this point that the investigation ended
with a decision not to bring him to justice due to insufficient evidence.107 At any rate,
Sharon asserted the right to silence during his interrogation.108 The police refrained
from searching Sharon’s home because at the time, he resided on the premises of his
father, Ariel Sharon, who served then as Israel’s prime minister.109 Instead of asking
the court to lift the prime minister’s immunity from searches,110 the police asked the
Magistrate’s Court to order Gilad Sharon to furnish documents related to the investigation based on Article 43 of the Criminal Procedure (Detention and Search)
Ordinance [New Version], which states that if judges think that an item is necessary
or useful for investigation or trial, they may instruct persons who possess that item to
present or furnish it at the time and place specified in the order.111 The police requested
101
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for violating a campaign finance law).
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the submission of business-related documents that included records of transfers of
money to and from Sharon’s bank accounts, correspondence between Sharon and
others regarding those transfers, his company’s documents of incorporation, details
of its income, and its list of clients and contracts with customers.112
Article 43 of the Israeli Detention and Search Ordinance is seemingly quite
expansive.113 While in previous cases, the Israeli Supreme Court refrained from
deciding whether the privilege against self-incrimination protects accused persons
from an obligation to submit documents,114 there was no escape from such a decision
in the Sharon case.115
Article 47(a) of the Evidence Ordinance extends the protection of the privilege
beyond the right to silence.116 It grants accused persons a right to not provide evidence
if it constitutes an admission of guilt.117 Section 52 of this Ordinance applies this
provision to investigative proceedings.118 On the face of this Ordinance, it also protects
accused individuals from the obligation to disclose real evidence.119 The Magistrate’s
Court issued a warrant requiring Gilad Sharon to submit the documents set forth
therein to the police and rejected his request to cancel the warrant.120 The District
Court accepted Sharon’s appeal and overturned the Magistrate’s Court decision,
holding that Section 43 of the Detention and Search Ordinance can only be directed
at third parties and not at suspects.121
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the District Court’s decision and held
that suspects may not assert the right to remain silent in the face of a warrant requiring the submission of documents but are only protected from self-incrimination.122
Hence, suspects are under an obligation to submit documents regarding themselves;
they have no claim of self-incrimination protecting them from being required to
provide these documents.123
112
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Moreover, according to the Supreme Court’s ruling, suspects are not allowed to
ignore a judicial warrant to hand over documents even when such documents might
incriminate them, but suspects can ask the court to discharge them from the obligation
to submit the required documents.124 In such a case, the court should hold an ex parte
hearing of the suspects’ request to exempt them from the obligation to submit documents and should examine each document for its potential for self-incrimination.125
If the document does carry such a potential, the court may nevertheless order its
submission to the police under a grant of immunity.126
At any rate, the Israeli Supreme Court did not stop at drawing a line between
documents that might expose suspects to criminal liability and documents that might
incriminate third parties.127 It significantly eroded the protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination by asserting that it solely applies to private documents,
which are created by suspects and bear similarities to testimonies, such as personal
diaries, private letters, appointment books, or documents prepared for the purpose
of the suspects’ defense, but not to public documents.128 The Court broadly defined
public documents not only as those required by law, but as documents created by an
objective body such as a bank.129
The distinction between public and private documents found no support in
Sections 47 and 52 of the Evidence Ordinance, which provides accused persons with
protection from the duty to submit documents if they imply an admission of guilt.130
That distinction is unjustifiable as well. If the privilege against self-incrimination
does extend to documents, then the incriminating potential embedded in the document, rather than the nature of the document, must be the decisive factor as to the
applicability of the privilege.
The Court excluded items such as a stolen property or a gun that had allegedly
been used for the commission of a murder from the duty of submission, asserting
that the mere submission of such items might incriminate their holders.131 However,
since those items are not “private,” according to the Court’s definition, this exclusion, though obvious, demonstrates the problem of drawing a line between private
and public documents for the purpose of applying the privilege.132
To conclude, the privilege against self-incrimination in Israel does not apply to
physical examinations. It applies to the obligation to submit documents only when
they are private and have incriminating potential. It does not protect suspects from
124
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the obligation to submit public documents, but it does protect defendants from potentially handing over potentially criminal items, such as the weapon used to commit
an offense.
C. Canada
In Canada, there is an obligation to provide documents when they concern offenses that are not mala in se and the essential purpose of the submission is regulatory.
The government needs to regulate trade and economic life, even if regulation carries
criminal sanctions such as imprisonment.133 Generally, persons who made a conscious and uncoerced choice to participate in regulatory activities that require turning
over documents are not entitled to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination for
their failure to comply with that obligation.134 Such persons are perceived as consenting
to the terms of the regulatory activity.135 Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld
the validity of an obligation to provide documents that shed light on price fixing in
the framework of antitrust law,136 and of an obligation imposed on fishermen to submit
documents relating to the amount and places of fishing, even though exceeding the
fishing quota might lead to imprisonment, since the need to maintain fisheries’ survival and the need for fair distribution of fishermen’s profits justify supervision.137
At the same time, the Canadian Supreme Court held that people are protected
from bodily searches and the seizure of findings related to a person’s body, such as
head hair, oral specimens, blood tests, and tooth bites, by the privilege against selfincrimination.138 The Canadian Parliament nonetheless authorized courts to allow
police to seize hair, buccal swabs, and blood samples for DNA testing, if there is
probable cause for the commission of a serious crime, particularly serious violent
and sex offenses, and DNA tests could confirm or deny a match between the suspect’s DNA and the DNA found at the scene of the crime.139 The Canadian Supreme
Court asserted that this statute passes constitutional muster and that it is a reasonable
search under Section 8 of the Canadian Charter given, inter alia, the limited harm to
health suspects face and the public interest in law enforcement of serious offenses.140
133
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The Court highlighted two justifications that underpin the privilege against selfincrimination: protecting the reliability of the evidence and protecting accused persons
from abuse of power by the state.141 Justifications centered on the fear of unreliable
evidence are rarely relevant given the great reliability of DNA evidence.142 As for
the fear of abuse of power by the state, even though there are adversarial relations
between the state and accused individuals, the law sets forth protections against abuse
of power such as the issuance of a warrant, the evidentiary requirements for its issuance, the severity of the offenses at bar, and the scope of the hazard to suspects’
health.143 The Canadian Supreme Court emphasized that the privilege against selfincrimination requires that the state present prima facie evidence without the individuals’ coercive participation144 but, as noted, held constitutional the taking of DNA
samples under certain circumstances.
D. The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) drew a distinction between
searches and submission of documents. Addressing the obligation to hand over documents to law enforcement agencies, the ECHR has given the privilege against selfincrimination broad scope.145 Thus, in the Funke case, the ECHR held that compelling
a person to submit documents violates both the right to silence and the privilege
against self-incrimination.146
Jean-Gustave Funke appealed to the ECHR complaining that France had violated
the European Convention when it ordered him to furnish documents and imposed
fines on him for refusing to do so.147 After he passed in 1987, his wife Ruth continued
the prosecution on his behalf.148
According to the facts of the case, in 1980, Funke’s home was searched by customs
officers who were investigating tax evasion offenses following financial transactions
conducted with foreign countries.149 After a few hours of search, the officers seized
some documents and checks from foreign banks, a car repair bill from Germany, and
two cameras.150 Failing to find evidence of tax offenses, the customs authorities
asked Funke to provide them with documents for the years 1977 through 1979 of his
141
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accounts with foreign banks, and a receipt for a house he had purchased in Germany.151
Initially, Funke expressed his willingness to produce the requested documents, but
later changed his mind.152 During various legal proceedings in France, Funke was
obliged by an order issued under the authority of the French Customs Code to
furnish the requested documents or pay a fine for each day of violation.153
The ECHR held that compelling Funke to hand over documents that the customs
authorities believed, yet were not certain, existed and did not try to pursue by other
means clearly contravened the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, adding that the unique characteristics of tax offenses do not justify such
violations.154
The ECHR continued to include compelled submission of documents within the
ambit of the privilege against self-incrimination.155 In the Saunders case, it held that
introducing into evidence at trial statements and documents gathered pursuant to the
Companies Act, which requires the provision of statements and documents to inspectors who investigated commercial and financial affairs of a company on pain of
imprisonment, violated the privilege against self-incrimination.156
Another case concerned J.B., a Swiss citizen who was suspected of not reporting
earnings from investments in some companies to the tax authorities.157 J.B. admitted
that he did not properly report his income but declined to comply with the tax authorities’ demand to hand over documents relating to his investments in those companies
even after he was repeatedly slapped with administrative fines for his refusal.158
Finally, J.B. and the tax authorities reached an agreement, and the administrative
fines were canceled with the understanding that the agreement would not prejudice
J.B.159 in his application to the ECHR against the legality of the fine imposed on him
for failing to comply with the requirement to hand over documents.160
The ECHR held that the privilege against self-incrimination was violated in J.B.’s
case since the privilege implies that law enforcement agencies must prove their case
through their own independent efforts without resorting to evidence obtained in
defiance of the accused person’s will.161
At the same time, the ECHR did not recognize the applicability of the privilege
against self-incrimination to physical examinations, with the exception detailed
151
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below.162 It stated that the privilege does not extend to evidence that exist independently of accused persons’ will, such as documents acquired pursuant to a warrant,
blood and urine samples, and body samples taken for DNA tests.163 The Court did
not explain the distinction between documents that also have existence independent
of accused persons’ will and physical examinations.164
In the case of Jalloh v. Germany, an exception was made to the rule such that
the privilege against self-incrimination is unavailable in situations of search.165 In
general, German law draws a line between accused persons’ compelled active cooperation, protected by the privilege against self-incrimination, and examinations
necessary for the discovery of the truth, which do not require accused persons’ active
cooperation but only endurance (Duldungsplichten).166 Section 81A of the German
Code of Criminal Procedure allows taking samples from suspects’ bodies through
intrusive action without their consent, provided that there is no risk to their health.167
In the Jalloh case, vomit-inducing drugs were forcibly administered to obtain
evidence of a suspect’s drug trafficking offense.168 Police officers saw the defendant
removing a small plastic bag from his mouth and handing it over to another person on
two occasions.169 The police arrested the defendant on the ground that the bags contained drugs, and the defendant swallowed another bag upon arrest.170 The police took
the defendant to the hospital, where a physician forcibly gave him a vomiting drug,
using a tube he had inserted into the defendant’s stomach through his nose.171 As a
result, the defendant regurgitated a bag that contained just over 0.2 grams of cocaine.172
The Court held that even though certain physical examinations are legitimate,173
and though the privilege against self-incrimination does not rule them out,174 forced
medical intervention for the purpose of extracting evidence should be convincingly
justified under the circumstances.175 In view of Jalloh’s feelings of humiliation and
162
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anxiety, and the potentially adverse health effects his examination entailed,176 the
accused was subjected to humiliating and inhumane treatment in contravention of
Article 3 of the European Convention.177 Under these circumstances, the admission
of the drugs as evidence at trial rendered the procedure unfair as a whole.178
As for the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court acknowledged that the evidence concealed in the defendant’s body and which has been
forcibly obtained through the use of a vomiting drug does fall into the category of
evidence that exists independently of the accused’s will.179 However, some characteristics distinguish this case from other cases.180 In this case, the vomiting drugs
were administered to extract real evidence against the will of the suspect and not to
merely gather material for forensic examinations.181 Also, the degree of force used
to extract the evidence was significantly greater than the coercion applied in other
cases.182 While in other cases, accused persons had to passively endure minor interferences with their bodies or were required to take some active action that involved
substances produced by the normal function of the body, such as breathing, urine,
and sound, in this case, the forced insertion of a nasal tube and of a substance were
meant to elicit a pathological response of the body.183 This examination also involved
hazards to health.184 In addition, the evidence was obtained, as stated, by degrading
means in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention.185 Thus, the gathering
of evidence undermined the privilege against self-incrimination as well.186
The ECHR did not explain why the degree of force exerted, the potential hazards
the defendant faced, and the fact that the elicited evidence did not involve normal body
functions are relevant for the privilege’s application.187
In another case, the European Court of Human Rights accepted the petition of
R.S. v Hungary, asserting that Hungary breached the petitioner’s right under Article
3 of the European Convention, which outlaws inhuman or degrading treatment.188
In the case of R.S., a physician inserted a catheter for urine examination, the aim of
which was to find evidence of a DUI offense, without genuine consent from R.S.
176
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and despite his explicit objection when the physician started the insertion.189 The
question of the violation of the privilege against self-incrimination did not arise in
that case.190 The Court held that Article 3 of the European Convention does not preclude the use of medical measures in defiance of the will of accused persons to obtain
evidence of a criminal offense.191 However, any compulsory medical intervention
designed to obtain evidence of a crime should be convincingly justified under the
circumstances of the case.192 This especially proves true for invasive treatment, which
requires careful examination of the circumstances of the case while paying attention
to the severity of the offense at hand.193 Furthermore, the state should show that it had
considered other means of pursuing the evidence.194 The decisive factors for considering the legality of an examination are the degree of necessity of the compulsory
medical intervention to obtain evidence, its potential and actual adverse health effects,
its manner of performance, the physical and mental suffering it caused, and the degree
of medical supervision available.195 In that case, the right of the suspect not to be
subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment was violated for several reasons.
The catheter insertion was not necessary because the suspect had already been taken
for a blood test for the detection of drugs and alcohol and the effectiveness of a urine
test for the detection of substances is questionable.196 Also, given the controversy
among medical experts, there is no certainty that the examination did not entail
hazards to the suspect’s health.197 The examination was carried out in a way that was
liable to provoke feelings of insecurity, anger, stress, and humiliation and also actually
led to physical pain and mental suffering.198
Although the ECHR did not address the case of R.S. through the lens of the
privilege against self-incrimination, it is easy to discern the analogy between this case
and Jalloh’s case, where the invasion of the body, which was disproportionate to the
gravity of the crime attributed to the accused person, was protected by the privilege.199
To complete the picture regarding the rulings of the European Court of Human
Rights, it is interesting to consider its construing by the Privy Council.200 The Privy
Council asserted that the Tax Commissioner in Jersey may comply with a request
of the Norwegian tax authorities to provide information about a company operating
189
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in Georgia, requiring that the company hand over documents testifying to the status
of its assets and customers, even though Norway refused to guarantee in advance
that incriminating documents would not be used against their providers.201 The Privy
Council held that the ECHR has not categorically precluded the exercise of coercive
powers to seize documents during an investigation,202 and that such a prohibition was
not in line with the Saunders case.203 According to the Privy Council, the European
Court had taken into account the nature and extent of the compulsion used to obtain
the evidence.204 The case at bar, however, did not concern an indictment for refusing
to provide evidence.205 The sanction that the said company could expect due to its
failure to hand over the documents was a fine, and officials were not personally
obliged to hand over documents.206
The Privy Council additionally held that there is a public interest in international
cooperation regarding investigations of potential tax offenses,207 and in maintaining the
integrity of registered financial service providers.208 The question of the admissibility
of the documents as evidence at trial is a separate issue that did not arise in that case.209
Norway is committed to the European Convention and Jersey does not have to deal
with hypothetical issues about the way Norway would like to use the documents.210
According to the Privy Council’s interpretation, therefore, under certain circumstances,
suspects may be required to hand over documents to law enforcement agencies, although the said documents may not necessarily be introduced into evidence at trial.
E. A Brief Summary of the Comparative Law
A review of the comparative law demonstrates that there is no consensus on the
applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination to physical examinations and
to the obligation to hand over documents.
The United States and Israel do not include physical examinations in the ambit of
the privilege and provide limited protection to documents. Unlike in Israel, law enforcement agencies in the United States may not require suspects to hand over documents subject to certain categories and thus be aided by their intellectual efforts.211
Canada applies the privilege to physical examinations but not to documents.212 The
201
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European Court of Human Rights applies the privilege to the obligation to hand over
documents and probably also to invasive and unconventional physical examinations.213
The privilege against self-incrimination, however, could not be asserted regarding
non-invasive searches and examinations.214 At any rate, it appears that the protection
accorded to accused persons by the privilege against compulsory physical examinations and the obligation to submit documents is limited.
In the next Part, the Article addresses the distinctions between compelled speech
on the one hand and compelled physical examinations and obligation of handing over
documents on the other hand. It examines whether the justifications underlying the
prohibition on compelled speech dictate different outcomes as compared with the
obligation to submit documents and to endure physical examinations.
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN COMPELLED SPEECH, COMPELLED PHYSICAL
EXAMINATIONS, AND OBLIGATIONS TO HAND OVER DOCUMENTS
A. Epistemic Justifications for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
1. Protecting the Innocent
Protecting the innocent is one of the central justifications for the privilege against
self-incrimination.215 Innocent suspects may make a false confession under investigative pressure, stress, and anxiety, coupled by the belief that confession could
benefit them while denial might not help them in light of the incriminating evidence,216 true or false.217 Since innocent suspects are subject to oppressive investigative techniques and may lie or confess because of the confusion, pressure, and distress
they feel in a situation that is threatening by nature, silence might protect them from
wrongful convictions.218
Yet, there is a distinction between speaking and handing over documents and
enduring physical examinations in terms of protecting innocent suspects.219
Innocent suspects may, of course, wish to refrain from physical examinations
or handing over documents not because of their willingness to conceal the truth, but
213
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216
Id. at 92–94.
217
Thus, in the United States, Canada, and Israel, interrogators may lie to suspects about
the existence of incriminating evidence against them. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Extending Miranda:
Prohibition on Police Lies Regarding the Incriminating Evidence, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
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because of their fear of the violation of values protected by the right against unreasonable searches.220 Yet, compelled physical examinations and documents’ submission cannot produce unreliable evidence. Documents are tangible things. The origin
and reliability of public documents can easily be traced. Similarly, drugs found in
a person’s body during an invasive examination constitute reliable evidence.221
Indeed, as mentioned, innocent suspects may fear the violation of their privacy
and other values involved in intrusive searches and examinations of documents.
Furthermore, the concern of reliability also applies to physical examinations such as
DNA tests, which might be mistakenly interpreted, and are prone to errors in collecting
and analyzing their findings.222 Innocent suspects, therefore, may also be concerned
about the conduct and accuracy of scientific tests.223 Thus, even regarding the
Canadian case in which the Canadian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the power to carry out unconsented DNA tests under certain conditions and in serious offenses, controversy arose over the results of the test.224 The reliability concern
also applies to documents, which might implicate innocent suspects.225 Since suspects
are not only required to hand over documents but also to classify them, misclassification or inadvertent submission of wrong documents may be detrimental.226 The fear
of unreliability might be further exacerbated if the results of polygraph tests or brain
imaging are introduced into evidence at trial.227
However, real evidence is less prone to manipulation through physical or psychological coercion.228 The crucial point that distinguishes between compelled speech
and compulsion aiming at finding existing real evidence is the lack of linkage between
220

See Easton, supra note 6, at 27; see also FELDMAN, supra note 3, § 1.01.
See R.S. v. Hungary, App. No. 65290/14, ¶ 48 (July 2, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
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222
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the pressures exerted when gathering the evidence and their reliability.229 Greater harm
to human dignity, which may be manifested in the use of force or the invasion of privacy, does not impair the reliability of the evidence. There is no connection between
the reliability of evidence obtained by physical examinations and submission of documents and the accused persons’ mental state and ability to defend themselves.
Some scholars posit that the justification that underpins the privilege against selfincrimination does relate to the reliability of coercive evidence. Thus, Amar and Lettow
famously proposed that courts compel suspects to make statements during a courtsupervised investigation, while prohibiting the statements from being admitted at
trial but permitting admittance of their fruits.230 According to Amar and Lettow, this
suggestion removes the fear of the unreliability of compelled testimony.231 Undoubtedly, it accentuates the two main groups of justifications that underlie the privilege
against self-incrimination: epistemological justifications versus non-epistemological
justifications. As we demonstrate below, the central justification for the privilege
against self-incrimination is the prohibition on bending the will of accused individuals.
This prohibition is closely related to the burden placed upon the state to prove guilt.
2. The Pooling Effect and the Theory of Excuse
The pooling effect theory provides an epistemic justification for the privilege
against self-incrimination. According to Alex Stein and Daniel Seidmann, the right to
silence can help the innocent on the assumption that almost only guilty people exercise it, and that innocent suspects invoke it only in unusual cases.232
Stein and Seidmann assume that silence is normally invoked to disguise guilt.233
Innocent suspects wish to clear their names as soon as possible by refuting the suspicions against them.234 The innocents have an interest in revealing the truth because the
truth works in their favor and undermines the incriminating evidence against them.235
The possibility that innocent suspects might implicate themselves while telling the
truth is unlikely and certainly does not reflect the rule.236 By contrast, criminals often
prefer to remain silent rather than to tell the truth or to lie, because lies can be positively refuted and consequently remove doubt regarding their guilt, while silence
could lead to acquittal based on the existence of a reasonable doubt.237
229
See, e.g., Vorlaw Tr. & Corp. Servs. v. Off. of the Comptroller of Taxes [2019] UKPC
29, [45] (appeal taken from Eng.); Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self
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Contrary to the opinion that opposes the right to silence because it shelters only
the guilty, Stein and Seidmann assert that precisely from the point of guilt it is wrong
to exert indirect pressures on criminals to lie instead of remaining silent, as such pressures might militate against the innocents.238
Since criminals are motivated to invoke their right to silence, it is easier to
distinguish between guilty suspects who exercise it and the innocents who do not.239
If the right to silence is deprived, criminals would choose to lie.240
Criminals’ lies inflict negative externalities on innocent suspects. Since investigators are aware of the motivation of criminals to lie, innocent suspects, who cannot
corroborate their statements with external exculpatory evidence, might be harmed
because multiplied false statements erode the reliability of their statements and
consequently increase the risk of their wrongful convictions.
According to the pooling effect theory, the protection accorded by the privilege
against self-incrimination should be applied to evidence only when there is a risk of
entering the pool through lies that impose external costs on the innocents.241 Therefore, the privilege should apply to documents and physical examinations only to the
extent that individuals can affect their contents.242 Thus, the privilege should not
extend to the obligation to participate in a lineup or to submit samples.243 Existing
handwritten documents constitute physical and non-testimonial evidence.244 However, handwriting or voice samples obtained through coercion should be classified
as testimonial evidence because suspects can alter their handwriting or voice.245
Relying on the accused to tell the truth draws the line between acts protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination, such as the handing over of documents in the
Hubbell case, and acts that are not.246 According to this theory, suspects may not be
protected from having their thoughts read if they cannot control them.247
The pooling effect theory also fits Stuntz’s theory of excuse in terms of the
application of the privilege to documents’ submission and physical examinations.248
According to this theory, suspects and defendants who lie during investigation and
238
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trial may be exempt from criminal liability given the human tendency to tell lies in
order to escape conviction.249 The right to remain silent is accorded to suspects and
defendants on the assumption that silence is preferable to lies, because giving implicit permission to lie can cause mistrust of the testimony of accused persons,
encourage them to lie, and impair the integrity of the criminal justice system.250 However, because it is impossible to lie about physical evidence such as blood samples,
there is no justification to allow silence as a substitute for exemption from criminal
liability for perjury.251 Since people can lie and change their voice or handwriting in
voice or handwriting samples, as mentioned above, such samples could be included
in the ambit of the privilege.252 Stuntz, however, argues that such a lie is very difficult,
and therefore, excluding such evidence from the ambit of the privilege may be justified.253 By contrast, the privilege should cover the obligation to hand over documents whose whereabouts are unknown to the police and cannot be accessed through
lawful searches, because accused persons who are required to hand over documents
can practically choose the possibility of falsehood and dishonesty.254
Another opinion that aligns with the theories of the pooling effect and excuse
holds that only when accused persons are forced to produce evidence from their
memory should they be given the option of silence as an alternative to lying.255 Therefore, on the assumption that under certain situations where truth-seeking devices are
employed, such as a polygraph or brain imaging, persons have no control over their
physiological reactions or brain-transmitted signals and therefore cannot manipulate
the evidence,256 the rationale of reliability will negate the applicability of the privilege
against self-incrimination to such situations.257 If the reliability of those devices is
proven, and if the reliability is the rationale underlying the privilege against selfincrimination, accused persons should not be protected against employing those
devices.258 Thus, because accused persons cannot opt to lie, the pooling effect theory
and the excuse theory do not offer them protection against the intrusion of their
thoughts259 and lead, therefore, to the non-applicability of the privilege against selfincrimination to situations where persons have no control over their reactions.260
249
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Such situations do not incentivize people to lie, since lies are impractical and would
soon be revealed.
The Article will now address non-epistemic justifications for the privilege
against self-incrimination.
B. Non-Epistemic Justifications for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
1. Protecting Privacy and Dignity
The privilege against self-incrimination was also justified as protecting the
privacy of accused persons.261 Protecting privacy is important because privacy is
necessary to autonomy and personal identity.262 Privacy allows persons to control
information that relates to them when it is transmitted to others.263 Some have noted
that because accused persons know whether or not they are associated with the offense
attributed to them, this knowledge is private and thus protected by the privilege.264
As for the invasion of privacy, it is argued that a requirement to hand over documents impairs the privacy of suspects less than a search does, because a requirement
to hand over documents does not involve searching the individual’s belongings and
allows suspects to defend themselves by appealing to the court.265 While searches can
reveal personal documents, persons who submit documents give only the requested
documents and prevent the widespread infringement of their privacy beyond the harm
involved in scrutinizing the contents of those documents. Also, there are documents
that do not impair or only slightly impair the privacy of suspects, such as a receipt
for a vehicle’s repair.266
The Canadian Supreme Court held that persons’ expectation of privacy in relation to documents required by regulatory laws is minimal because these documents
were meant to be perused and trusted by the relevant state authorities.267 Such documents reveal nothing about the personality, thoughts, and opinions of the individuals
who created them, and the information they provide is limited to the purpose for
certain brain imaging techniques will not be protected by the privilege. Stoller & Wolpe,
supra note 1, at 369.
261
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which they were created.268 As for searches and examinations, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that providing a handwriting sample does not normally violate
persons’ privacy since their handwriting is inherently exposed to the public.269 By
the same token, this rule applies to persons’ voices.270
Some posit that a requirement to submit documents and to endure physical examinations is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination because it does
not invade individuals’ mental processes, such as their knowledge, memories, hopes,
beliefs, desires, and thoughts.271 Because pursuit of an existing document does not
depend on individuals’ will, such information belongs less to individuals than the
information contained in their minds.
However, if the privilege against self-incrimination aims to protect privacy and
the cognitive products of individuals, accused persons are protected from invasions
of their brains, as that might reveal their selfhood.272
In addition, because people reveal personal and private information when they
write a personal diary, which may be viewed as an extension of the human mind, some
posit that obliging persons to submit their diary is analogous to coercing them to
speak.273 Like speech, a personal diary raises problems of reliability because people
write down their fantasies, dreams, and stories that do not necessarily reflect actual
reality.274 Writing down thoughts is part of peoples’ thinking and memory-preserving
process, and the fear of seizure of their personal documents could inhibit their intellectual development.275 Documents that physically manifest thinking processes should
therefore be accorded more protection.276 Thus, as Bradley put it, a personal diary
deserves more protection than a “diary” entitled “Robberies I Have Performed.”277
When the invasion takes place not only in one’s belongings but also in one’s mental
processes, the psychological harm caused is greater.278 The United States Supreme
Court has left open the question of whether private documents such as a personal
268
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diary are protected from search and seizure.279 In Germany, however, the Supreme
Court held that, while seizing a personal diary apparently constitutes an encroachment
of the core right to privacy, diary authors release their thoughts from their control.280
Still, although diary authors put their thoughts on paper voluntarily, they choose to
keep their thoughts in a private document rather than to share them with others.281
Similarly, when persons sit at home and browse through internet sites according to
their interests, without sharing the content of the search with anyone, it is hard to
argue that they have released their thoughts from their control due to the inevitable
submission of digital information to third parties.
The protection of privacy will, therefore, lead to the applicability of the privilege
against self-incrimination to personal documents and to the penetration of thoughts.
Indeed, some argue that the privilege against self-incrimination protects individuals’
minds, while the right against unreasonable search protects real evidence.282
At the same time, however, existing and emerging technologies seem to blur the
distinction between physical evidence, such as codes, fingerprints, or facial recognition with which computers or mobile phones can be accessed, and mental knowledge.283 Questions may arise such as whether it is possible to oblige accused persons
to decode their documents for the interrogators or to provide them with access codes
to their mobile phones, computer hard disks, or documents stored in the cloud. Some
opine that document discovery warrants also oblige accused persons to provide
password-protected documents, and that there is no relevant distinction in terms of the
ambit of the privilege against self-incrimination between cell phone access through
facial recognition or fingerprints and providing passwords that have no testimonial
aspects.284 If the code is registered somewhere, accused persons may be obliged to
hand over the document on which the code is registered, just as they may be obliged
to hand over other existing documents which have been voluntarily made.285 Yet,
279
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while a key to a safe exists in the physical world, the code to the safe, or any other
code for that matter, (provided the individual had not written it down somewhere)
exists only in individuals’ minds.286 Some posit that if the access code to documents
is stored in individuals’ minds, it should be shielded from disclosure by the privilege
against self-incrimination because obligating individuals to hand it over implies
their compulsion to speak.287
Courts in the United States have reached different conclusions on the issue of
the obligation to hand over passwords.288 In England, the Court of Appeal held that
suspects were obligated to furnish their interrogators with the codes for documents
stored on their computers, stressing that the documents have independent existence
that is separate from suspects’ will and that a code is neutral evidence, while remaining open to the possibility of excluding incriminating evidence resulting from such
searches.289 Some emphasize that at the time the documents were created, no adversarial relationships between the suspect and law enforcement agencies existed.290
Scholars have asserted that accused persons should be obligated to provide a password
to their computers or mobile phones as part of an appropriate balance of interests
between individuals’ rights and the necessities of law enforcement.291 While it is
possible to break into a safe without knowing its code, police investigators often
have no way to access computer files or cell phones without their passwords.292 Some
posit, however, that the fact that police investigators cannot access information does
not accord them the right to employ improper investigative techniques while violating fundamental human rights.293
Smartphones are currently an integral part of our life to the extent that, as the
United States Supreme Court put it, a stranger coming from another planet would
see it as an important part of human anatomy.294 We live in a world where much of
286
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the information about our lives is recorded and stored forever on our computers.295
We provide private information to third parties on which we depend for the proper
management of our lives in the digital age.296 Our devices store our hopes, desires,
and thoughts, hence the search for information in them severely erodes our privacy.297
Considering violations of privacy, human dignity, and the right of individuals to
maintain their autonomous sphere, it is hard to distinguish between the obligation
to make statements and subjecting our bodies and personal documents to intrusive
inspections. Obligating suspects to make statements regarding the accusations against
them does not violate their dignity and personal autonomy more than an obligation
to endure a gynecological examination or forced surgery or to provide a personal diary
that contains their most inner thoughts.298 The Canadian Supreme Court perceived
the intrusion of the body as a serious violation of human dignity and privacy.299 Indeed,
the less personal the document, the lower the violation of privacy. Still, not all personal
knowledge exposed is an infringement of privacy.300 It cannot be argued that an
obligation to hand over documents or to decipher them severely violates the privacy
of a person more or less when weighed against an obligation to speak or the seizure
of documents through lawful search. The degree of the violation of privacy involved
in these situations varies.
Intrusion of the mind through thought-reading threatens our privacy in a new
and profound way.301 It threatens to reveal the individual’s selfhood.302 Naturally, it is
viewed as a nightmarish characteristic of totalitarian regimes.303 Penetrating the mind
is more detrimental to human dignity and privacy than body intrusion.304 Individuals
295
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cannot develop a self-concept as an autonomous person without having some space
others cannot access.305 Indeed, individuals have no absolute right to be protected
from search of their homes and personal effects, despite the violation of privacy. Yet,
while the information contained in documents or obtained from physical examinations
is limited, the information existing in the human mind is infinite and unfocused.306
Technological means capable of penetrating individuals’ brains are more likely to
impair their dignity and privacy than traditional methods of tracing individuals’
thoughts.307 Searching the brain with technological means can absorb many thoughts
that are unrelated to the suspicions against the person. Even if the brain search results
in the acquittal of the innocent individual, the concomitant violation of the individual’s
privacy will be enormous.308
However, separate from the violation of privacy and dignity, it may be argued
that the privilege against self-incrimination protects knowledge possessed by accused
persons. Thus, as stated above, the United States Supreme Court held that an obligation imposed on a suspect to participate in a lineup, put strips of tape on his face,
and utter a sentence compelled him to display physical features rather than his
knowledge.309 In another case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that questioning a DUI suspect to gauge his speech does not compel him to provide testimonial
evidence, and that the speech test was only used to ascertain the suspect’s inability
to clearly pronounce words due to the lack of coordination between the muscles of his
tongue and mouth.310 By contrast, the Court determined that the suspect’s “I don’t
know” answer to the question, “When was your sixth birthday?” was protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination, since it indicated his confused mental state.311
If the privilege does protect individuals’ minds, which include their thoughts, feelings,
memories, and constitution of their selfhood, people should be protected from mind
mapping and techniques that penetrate their thoughts against their will.312
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However, the protection of privacy is a concomitant consequence of the right
to silence and not its purpose or cause.313 Suspects are not protected from the invasion
of their privacy while other, permissible investigatory techniques to discover the
truth are employed, such as asking people about themselves, eavesdropping on their
conversations, or searching their homes and effects.314 The United States Supreme
Court explicitly clarified that privacy is not the protected value underpinning the
privilege against self-incrimination, and that the privilege only protects compelled
self-incrimination and not the disclosure of private information.315 It should also be
recalled that under a grant of immunity, accused persons must disclose private information.316 Allegedly, if accused persons are accorded immunity for their brain
products, law enforcement agencies may be allowed to trace the information contained
in their brains, although the violation of privacy of persons who are accorded immunity and persons who do not is similar.317 It seems, therefore, that the privilege
against self-incrimination cannot provide protection against physical examinations,
including searches of the mind.318 Clearly, however, intrusive searches can be protected by other values.
2. Concern About the Abuse of Power by the State and the Maintenance of
Individuals’ Autonomy
While under criminal investigation, suspects face the threatening and hostile
environment of a police interrogation. The right to silence provides them with a
refuge in the face of what they may perceive as tyranny and abuse of power by law
enforcement agencies.319 Furthermore, it actually helps to prevent the tyranny of law
enforcement agencies, which might follow from their sense of unlimited power. The
right to silence clarifies to law enforcement agencies that their ability to control the
313
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suspects and to trace their actions and thoughts is limited. As such, the right to silence
forces interrogators to regard suspects as persons who have an independent will which
deserves respect, and not as a tool subject to their authority.320 Abrogating the right
to silence might oblige suspects to respond to any questions posed to them under
interrogation, thus rendering them helpless against the state’s power.321 Forcing suspects to speak might make interrogations oppressive and intrusive.322 Interrogators
who have a legal right to receive answers might harass and brainwash suspects.323
Obliging suspects to respond to questions under interrogation is greatly humiliating,
particularly when they are posed in an insulting and derisive manner, are irrelevant
to the offenses at hand, recurring, or just a reflection of the interrogators’ disbelief
of the suspect’s version of events. The right to silence, therefore, provides a way to
escape from the psychological pressures exerted during interrogations and protects
innocent suspects from being driven into making false confessions.324
Prima facie, the concern for suspects is much less relevant as to the requirement
to submit documents or endure physical examinations because such actions do not
entail penetrating the suspects’ minds with oppressive techniques.
Still, the importance of the suspects’ sense of certainty that the interrogators
may not invade their bodies, effects, and thoughts and the necessity of preventing
interrogators from perceiving suspects as tools subject to their control also proves
true regarding physical examinations and the obligation to submit documents.
Indeed, the need to establish a linkage between the required examinations and the
requested documents on the one hand and the evidence expected to be obtained on
the other hand restricts the interrogators’ ability to exercise arbitrary powers and
improper compulsion against accused persons. However, physical examinations and
requirements to submit documents might also serve as a weapon against suspects
who decline cooperation.325
The Israeli case of Gilad Sharon exemplifies the ability of interrogators to oppress
suspects when they are empowered, even by the court, to oblige suspects to cooperate
320
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with them.326 Following the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision, according to which
the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to public documents, Sharon
handed over some of the documents mentioned in the court’s order to the police.327
In a hearing conducted at the Tel Aviv Magistrate’s Court upon the state’s request,
Sharon declared that he had handed over all the documents in his possession.328 The
state insisted that additional documents included in the order were still in Sharon’s
possession and control.329 The Magistrate’s Court asserted that the state did present
evidence that the suspect possessed additional documents, while possession should
be construed broadly as the capability to obtain said items or documents.330 Since such
a capability existed regarding bank accounts and agreements to which a company
controlled by the suspect was allegedly a party, the suspect had to give the court a
detailed explanation of the reasons for his failure to comply with the order.331
The Tel Aviv District Court rejected Sharon’s appeal.332 It held that suspects who
claim that they do not physically or constructively possess all documents mentioned
in the order should ask the court to exempt them from complying with the order and
should additionally explain why they cannot hand over the requested documents and
where they are located.333 The District Court rejected Sharon’s argument that he was
only obliged to submit documents under his physical control that the police could
have seized under a search warrant if they had taken that path.334
In a verdict concerning Gilad Sharon’s appeal of the decision requiring him to
hand over documents that were not in his physical possession, the Israeli Supreme
Court upheld the District Court’s interpretation of the term “possession” as applying
to items over which suspects have control.335 Otherwise, suspects shall be exempt
from submitting documents that they gave others in order to conceal or that can be
easily obtained by logging onto their computer.336 The Court added that there is an
assumption that certain types of documents, such as the details of transactions in
bank accounts or signed contracts, are in the accused person’s possession or
control.337 Regarding documents that are not in the suspect’s possession, courts
should issue an order requiring the suspect to hand them over only if that is the
326
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reasonable option to obtain them, taking into account the time and financial resources
required from the suspect compared to the ability of law enforcement agencies to
obtain those documents.338
The Court clarified that suspects who allege that various documents listed in the
order are not in their possession must apply to the court that issued the order and ask
to be exempt from complying with the order while supplying explanations as to the
whereabouts of the requested documents and their ability to meet the order’s requirements.339 Moreover, though the order must be clear enough for its recipients to
understand what they are obliged to submit, the prosecution does not have to name
specific documents whose submissions are requested and can be sufficiently clear
just by pointing to categories of documents.340
Demanding that suspects who are unable to hand over documents mentioned in
the court order appeal to the court and be exposed to a cross-examination regarding
the whereabouts of the documents related to their interrogation is a gross violation of
their right to silence, to be left alone, and to act passively during the interrogation. It
forces suspects to initiate legal proceedings, which involve a considerable amount of
money, and to provide valuable information to the prosecution. It is hard not to notice
the potential for oppressive behavior by interrogators that is created by their empowerment to oblige suspects to provide documents and to endure physical examinations.
The Article turns now to the next justification which underpins the privilege
against self-incrimination: imposing the burden of proof on the prosecution. This
justification, which combines epistemic and non-epistemic aspects, advocates the
extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to physical examinations and
to document submission.
C. Combined Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Justifications: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination as Corollary of Imposing the Burden of Proof on the State
1. Non-Criminal Proceedings
In civil litigations and in non-criminal proceedings, the state does not function
as an accuser even to the extent that it is party to the litigation. Rather, the state is
accorded a regulatory role. Thus, in some situations, the state may impose supervision as a condition for licensing a business.341 Persons who engage in an activity that
justifies regulation and is subject to regulation should allow it as long as they know
in advance what documents they are obliged to prepare and maintain and as long as
these documents are rationally connected to the purpose of the regulation.342 Persons
338
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who enjoy the benefits of regulated activities such as driving, forming a corporation,
or trading on the stock exchange are under a moral obligation to follow the rules
governing the activity, which they could choose to avoid.343 In such situations, there
is no significant adversarial relationship between individuals and the state. In fact,
the regulation intends to direct the individuals’ initial behaviors and not to gather
evidence against them for a criminal offense.344
Hence, it appears that records that the law requires to be filed in order for the
state to regulate certain activities, such as the supervision of agricultural production
quotas or fisheries, should be excluded from the ambit of the privilege.345 However,
a situation in which clear criminal penalties are imposed for violating the rules of
regulation, most notably imprisonment, without use restriction on evidence gathered
through the compelled cooperation of regulated individuals is unacceptable.346 The
sanctions for violating regulatory conditions should be essentially administrative:
revocation of the license to engage in a particular activity and imposition of administrative fines (although a fine may be imposed in criminal proceedings, it is not as
stigmatic as imprisonment).
Similarly, it is legitimate to oblige persons to submit documents attesting to their
income to the relevant tax authorities347 and to prohibit them from concealing information from the authorities while pleading the privilege against self-incrimination.348
It is argued that the duty to pay taxes is incumbent on persons by their very residence
in a particular country and can be regarded as arising from the existence of a contract
between the individual and the state.349 The obligation to provide information is
intended to help the relevant tax authorities ascertain a person’s true income, based
on an acknowledgment of the state’s need to collect taxes. Only the taxpayers know
the income tax information, and contacting them with the requirement to provide
information and to submit documents does not create an adversarial relationship with
the state, nor does it attribute any blame to them.
On the normative level, compelling the submission of documents to the tax
authorities should be limited to the purpose of tax collection. The disclosure of fiscal
offenses should be pursued by other means. Thus, the United States Supreme Court
343
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held that persons may not refrain from filing the required income tax documents based
on the privilege against self-incrimination. They may, however, invoke a claim of
self-incrimination in response to a specific question regarding the document.350 This
rule should also hold true with regard to other documents required for the examination of compliance with regulatory conditions. Even when the initial purpose of the
obligation to hand over documents is regulatory, the introduction of such documents
into evidence at trial compels persons to be their own accusers.351 A barrier must
therefore be placed between the use of documents whose submission was obliged
for regulatory purposes and those used in criminal proceedings.
The American Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight case
is another example of the non-applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination
to non-criminal proceedings.352 This case involved a mother who abused her toddler
son.353 The Juvenile Court declared the toddler a minor in need and allowed the mother
to remain her son’s guardian under the supervision and guidance of the Baltimore
City Department of Social Services (BCDSS).354 BCDSS concluded that the mother
violated the terms of the protective order and asked the court to remove the minor
from her custody.355 The mother refused to disclose her son’s whereabouts and did
not obey the court’s order to bring the child in.356 The court ordered her imprisonment until the child was brought to court or until his whereabouts were disclosed,
while there was no assurance that the child was still alive.357 The Maryland State
Court of Appeals overturned the order, contending that the mother had reason to fear
that complying with the order might lead to her conviction.358 However, the United
States Supreme Court held that the mother could not avoid complying with the order
by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination.359 That privilege applies only to
the coercion of communicative evidence.360 Even if bringing the child has a testimonial component, implying that the child’s whereabouts are known to the mother and
that the child is under her control, she cannot be aided by the privilege. The inability
to utilize the privilege occurs because she has assumed duties as a guardian and because bringing the child is required in a non-criminal regulatory process, which is
carried out following the declaration of the child as a minor in need, and conditioning
350
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the guardianship of the mother on fulfilling certain stipulations.361 Here, the mother
was obliged to bring the child out of concern for his safety and not for the conduct
of criminal proceedings against her.362 The Court left open, however, the possibility
of use restriction on the testimonial aspect of complying with the court’s order.363
The dissenters in that case asserted that, under the circumstances of the case, no
line between the civil and criminal proceedings could be drawn, and that a requirement
to bring the child or to provide details of his whereabouts should be accompanied
by a grant of immunity.364
Some posit that it should have been simply stated that the privilege against selfincrimination has been compromised, but that this compromise is justified in light
of the state’s duty to care for the safety of minors.365 However, such a view can eviscerate the privilege against self-incrimination from its purpose, given the general duty
imposed on law enforcement agencies to protect public safety. Another article viewed
the mother’s consent to cooperate with the social services as a waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination, similar to defendants who plead guilty under a plea bargain.366 It is argued, however, that due to the conduct of a criminal investigation on
suspicion of the child’s murder by his mother, it is difficult to treat the requirement to
bring the child as a mere compliance with a regulatory order.367 It seems that the very
nature of parenthood implicitly contains a commitment to care for the well-being of
children and to obey other rules concerning their welfare, such as sending them to
educational institutions at the appropriate age. Parents cannot invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination to avoid sending their children to kindergarten or school
as required by law, where teachers can see signs of bruising on the child’s body. The
conclusion would have been different had parents been required to self-reporting
employing physical violence against their children.
2. Criminal Proceedings
A requirement that accused persons hand over documents to law enforcement
agencies curtails the burden of proof imposed on the state. According to the prevailing
moral theory of the Western world, the state bears the burden to prove the defendant’s guilt to a high degree of certainty in order to secure a conviction.
361
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Indeed, the privilege against self-incrimination is commonly associated with the
presumption of innocence. The central argument for that link relates to the prosecution’s obligation to prove guilt through its independent efforts without the aid of
accused persons and without requiring them to participate in the criminal proceedings against them.368 When accused persons are required to actively help their
accusers, they make it easier for the prosecution to discharge the burden of proof.369
In relation to the exclusion of evidence obtained by illegal means, the United
States Supreme Court has rhetorically asked whether there is a distinction between
evidence extracted from persons’ minds and evidence extracted from their bodies.370
However, in the context of the burden of proof imposed on the state, some draw a line
between a person’s duty to speak and the requirement that a person endure physical
examinations and produce documents and real evidence.371
One possible distinction relates to the hazard of incrimination that accused persons
face. Handing over a gun or document with clearly incriminating content directly
connects accused persons to offenses and should be protected by the privilege against
self-incrimination, in contrast with providing voice or written exemplars for which
an expert witness is required.372 Thus, when the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a law requiring a driver involved in an automobile accident to
furnish his or her name and address, the Court stressed that the required details were
neutral and insufficient in themselves to lead to the individual’s conviction.373 The
Court of Appeal in England asserted in a decision, according to which suspects may
be obliged to provide a computer code, that the code is neutral evidence.374 Similarly,
the European Court of Human Rights distinguished between extracting incriminating
evidence such as drugs and taking substances used for forensic examinations from
a suspect’s body.375 However, evidence is still considered incriminating if it is a link
in a chain leading to other incriminating evidence.376 Moreover, according to the line
368
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of thought that requires a direct connection between the act and the hazard of incrimination, it may be argued that accused persons should not enjoy an unimpeded right
to silence but only a right to silence in relation to incriminating statements. Nevertheless, given the autonomy of accused persons to shape their defenses, and in view
of the concern for wrongful convictions due to careless and damaging statements,
such a distinction would make no sense. And, indeed, the right to silence applies to
statements of any kind.377
The key distinction between compelled speech and compelled physical examinations and submission of documents relates to the creation of evidence versus the
disclosure and submission of existing evidence. Compelled speech might produce
statements that would not have been available otherwise. Similarly, an obligation
to create documents is equivalent to an obligation to make statements and to generate
new evidence.
By contrast, by enduring physical examinations or handing over documents, accused persons are not required to create the evidence but to hand over existing documents that they had in their possession378 and were voluntarily made.379 Documents
are independent items that speak for themselves.380 The evidence already exists in the
real world, the accused persons have not produced it for the prosecution, and the search,
examination, or submission merely revealed it.381 With regard to forcing people to
give voice or written exemplars, some have argued that as long as people play the
role of “actors” rather than “creators” and have to say or write a text that was chosen
for them, there is no difference between the use of their voice or handwriting and the
use of their facial features for identification.382
In Sharon’s case, the Israeli Supreme Court equated the obligation to hand over
documents with their seizure through a search warrant.383 Law enforcement agencies
can independently seize documents if they have sufficient information concerning
their whereabouts.384 Suspects are “not required to say anything while handing over
[the] documents” and may do it in silence.385 According to this view, the lack of knowledge by law enforcement agencies about the location of the documents or their inability
to access them does not diminish the burden of proof imposed on the state given the
right of law enforcement agencies to search and seize. Nevertheless, an order to
377
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hand over documents requires a mental effort by accused persons to connect the documents requested in the order with the documents in their possession or control.386
By the very submission of the documents, accused persons implicitly state that the
documents they provide are the documents described in the order.387 Therefore, there
is no analogy between seizing documents by lawful search and obliging accused persons to hand over documents to law enforcement agencies in terms of the assistance
required from accused persons to law enforcement agencies.
Silence is a defense strategy. Accused persons may remain silent so as not to
unduly respond under the pressure of police interrogation or cross-examination at
trial. As mentioned, this concern is irrelevant as to documents or physical examinations whose reliability does not depend on the mental states of accused persons, the
tension or pressure exerted on them, or the ability of accused persons to deal with
the questions posed to them.
Accused persons, however, may also remain silent because of their insistence
that the prosecution meet the burden of proof, and they may build their defense on
weaknesses and flaws in the prosecution’s case.388 They may fear that documents
might be misinterpreted and that the results of physical examinations, which, for
example, ascertain their presence at the scene of the crime, might militate against
them despite their innocence. Hence, insistence that the prosecution meet the burden
of proof rests on epistemic grounds as well.
In fact, the justification for the privilege against self-incrimination is primarily
based on respecting the autonomy of accused persons to decide the nature and extent
of their cooperation with law enforcement agencies in relation to the accusations
leveled against them.389 That autonomy to choose the best legitimate defense and to
avoid helping the prosecution build its narrative should be respected.
Accused persons could not practically decline cooperation if the burden of proof
of their innocence had been imposed on them. The ability of accused persons to
refrain from cooperating with law enforcement agencies is the result of imposing the
burden of proof on the state.
3. The Prevention of Trilemma: Between Passive and Active Cooperation
The trilemma argument supplements the previous subsection and may even
qualify parts of it. The trilemma argument, whereby accused persons should be protected against the need to choose one of the following three evils—self-incrimination
(if they choose to tell the truth); perjury (if they choose to lie); or contempt of court (if
they choose to violate the law by remaining silent)—provides a central justification
for the privilege against self-incrimination.390 An obligation imposed on persons to
386
387
388
389
390

Uviller, supra note 282, at 319–20.
Theophilopoulos, supra note 284, at 606–07.
Kitai-Sangero & Merin, supra note 215, at 102–03.
See O’Reilly, supra note 368, at 422.
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implicate themselves and the violation of their autonomy to decide whether to participate in pursuing their guilt involve humiliation.391 The right to silence saves accused
persons from the trilemma they face by giving them an option to choose a path that
does not directly harm them.392
The trilemma argument negates the analogy between seizing documents through
a search warrant and obliging accused persons to hand over documents and endure
certain physical examinations. Through the lens of the trilemma argument, there is
a distinction between passive and active cooperation. Searches of individuals’ homes,
effects, and bodies do not require active cooperation on their part. The United States
Supreme Court has emphasized that searches do not violate the privilege against
self-incrimination because the creators of the documents play only a passive role
during their conduct.393 They are not required to do anything while police perform the
search.394 When it comes to actions that can be done by another person, such as seizing
documents during a search, there is no trilemma since the actions are not under
suspects’ control.395 Brain searches by mind-simulation devices or the interpretation
of physiological responses, which do not depend on the subjects’ cooperation, do
not create a trilemma either.396 A lie detector forcibly attached to individuals’ bodies
that measures their responses and a brain-resonance device coercively attached to
a suspect’s head that reads their thoughts both extract information from the mind
without obliging persons to speak or take action. Brain imaging that examines blood
flow patterns or brain activity allows the state to extract information from the minds
of accused persons while rendering them unable to control the transmission of
information.397 Data technology that could be accessed through cyber-intermediaries
can also trace persons’ intimate actions without cooperation on their part.398
Some scholars allege that testimonial communication stems from the deliberate
action of persons to disclose information about mental states.399 Certain thoughtreading devices do not involve a conscious product of disclosure, as their purpose
U.S. 553, 563 (1983); JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33–34 (2005); Arenella, supra note 376, at 50–51.
391
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392
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393
E.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473–74 (1976).
394
Id.
395
Id. at 475–77; B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 598, 625 (1970).
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is to circumvent accused persons’ intent.400 In addition, scientific progress may make
it possible to employ measures that can compel suspects to act against their will and
to speak truthfully about their involvement in the offense attributed to them.401 In
such cases, it would be clear that the events occurred in isolation from the willingness of the accused to admit guilt.
However, accused persons who are forced to cooperate actively, e.g., through
submitting voice or handwriting samples or documents whose location is unknown
to the interrogators, face the same trilemma as do suspects who are required to make
statements.402 In these cases, they face what is perceived as a “cruel choice”: to yield
to the order and submit the documents or the samples; “to lie” by attempting to
distort their voice or handwriting, destroying the relevant document, or denying they
have it in their possession; or to breech the law by declining cooperation.403 The
results of this trilemma could be more difficult for law enforcement agencies if
accused persons choose the illegal option of document destruction.404 Forcing
accused persons to cooperate augments the violation of their dignity and privacy.405
It makes sense to talk about the sacrifice and self-betrayal required from accused
persons only in a state of active action on their part.406 Obliging accused persons to
cooperate infringes on their ability to remain passive during the criminal justice
process. By demanding their active cooperation, the state violates the moral autonomy of accused persons to decide whether or not to actively participate in establishing their guilt and cooperate with law enforcement agencies.407 Some emphasize that
it is cruel to use individuals’ bodies or personal documents to incriminate them.408
In the context of the obligation to submit documents, the United States Supreme
Court held that the violation of the sense of justice follows from the extraction of
evidence from the accused persons themselves.409 A demand of active cooperation
400
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overrides accused persons’ free will.410 The trilemma argument should, therefore,
lead to the extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to all cases of
compelled cooperation.411
Indeed, there are scholars who support the distinction between passive and
active cooperation as defining the ambit of the privilege against self-incrimination.412
According to this distinction, law enforcement agencies can take documents or real
evidence unilaterally but cannot require accused persons to provide them (unless
they prefer to do so as an alternative to lawful search).413 Whilst a person’s right against
unreasonable search imposes restrictions on the unilateral taking of evidence through
search and seizure, the privilege against self-incrimination protects accused persons
from being obliged to actively furnish evidence such as written exemplars.414
The distinction between active and passive cooperation for the application of the
privilege against self-incrimination protects accused persons from being compelled
to actively cooperate with law enforcement agencies but leaves them to passively
endure actions that prima facie can be carried out without their consent.
According to a view that excludes passive cooperation from the shield of the
privilege, accused persons may be viewed as a means of proving guilt.415 This view
was justified by an adage whereby persons’ bodies may be bent, but not their wills.416
Cartesian dualism, which views the body and the mind as two different objects,417
certainly allows this distinction.
According to this line of thought, just as the state may not force accused persons
to admit their guilt but may “obtain” such a confession by, for example, eavesdropping
on their conversations,418 the state may seize documents, but it may not oblige accused persons to hand them over.419
Some observe that a distinction that diverts the emphasis from the invasion of the
body and privacy to the extent of the cooperation required from accused persons does
not adequately preserve human dignity, the integrity of the body, and the appropriate
410
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balance between individual rights and the power of the state.420 This distinction results
in a person’s right not to be required to submit his or her handwriting or voice
exemplars (actions that require active cooperation and cannot be performed through
physical force), but not the person’s right to refuse to undergo surgery against their
will. This distinction allegedly exempts persons from handing over documents that
the law requires filing on the one hand, but allows chaining them to mind-reading
devices on the other hand.421 Removing any action that is technically feasible to perform by force from the ambit of the privilege against self-incrimination might cause
serious harm to human dignity and the integrity of the body and, under certain circumstances, might even border on torture.
There are, however, other values that safeguard privacy, human dignity, and the
physical integrity of the body.422 Regardless, various conclusions may be reached
about the reasonableness of a search involving an intrusion into a person’s thoughts.
Thus, while some contend that such a search is unreasonable and unconstitutional,423
others insist it would not necessarily be when weighing the gravity of the charges
attributed to accused persons and the danger they pose to public safety.424
Still, as mentioned above, the privilege against self-incrimination and the burden
of proof imposed on the state are intertwined. The rulings of the European Court of
Human Rights, which protect accused persons from prosecution or sanctions for
refusal to hand over documents to law enforcement agencies, express the ban on
defeating the will of accused persons to avoid cooperation with their accusers.425
Nevertheless, the contention that the distinction between passive and active
cooperation (stemming from the trilemma argument) should govern the ambit of the
privilege against self-incrimination presents significant difficulties. Sometimes,
there is a thin line between situations that require active cooperation on the accused
persons’ part and situations that do not.
It is clear that if people refuse to be subject to physical examinations that do not
involve active cooperation on their part, law enforcement agencies must use force to
perform them. However, the physical inability to resist a search, as in the Breithaupt
case, where the suspect was unconscious, does not negate the existence of coercion,
420
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just as sexual intercourse with an unconscious person is considered rape.426 The
decisive test for coercion is the knowledge of law enforcement agencies about the
suspect’s objection or failure to give a conscious consent to conduct the examination.427 There is a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of action.428 The
possibility of exerting physical power on helpless suspects while searching or
examining them despite their opposition or without their consent, for example, by
attaching a brain imaging device, does not eliminate the element of coercive cooperation on their part.429 The Canadian Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the
question of conscriptive evidence does not depend on the nature of the evidence but
on whether suspects were forced to make a statement or furnish a samples from their
bodies in violation of the Canadian Charter.430 In Winston v. Lee, though the United
States Supreme Court examined coercive surgery through the lens of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court addressed the humiliation involved in the performance of
surgery against an individual’s will, which is absent when consent is given.431
The fact that documents and real evidence do exist in the world does not change the
nature of the cooperation required from accused persons. By the same token, it can be
argued that a statement is also evidence since suspects are “only” required to speak
truthfully about past events that occurred in the objective reality independently of their
statements. However, since the burden of proof is put on the prosecution, accused
persons have a right to merely watch the prosecution make its case while choosing
a passive path of defense.
The right to passivity should also exist with respect to physical examinations,
which can be performed while exercising force and without the accused persons’
cooperation. The European Court of Human Rights viewed the insertion of a vomiting
426
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drug into a suspect’s stomach through a nasal tube as a violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination.432 Referring to an individual’s right not to be subjected
to torture, Cesare Beccaria asserted that, in the relationship between the state and the
individual, it is not appropriate to require the individual to be both the accused and
the accuser.433 Although a person suffers passively when tortured, there is no dispute
that the torture victim’s free will is overborne. Indeed, a person’s will is overborne
in any situation of compelled physical examination and compelled submission of
documents. When the evidence is obtained while threatening accused persons with
criminal sanctions or the exercise of force, it is elicited out of defiance of their will.
Some argue that when the Founders introduced the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, sanctifying the privilege against self-incrimination, their
intention was to shield individuals against the obligation to provide law enforcement
agencies with information, whether by making statements or handing over documents.434 Beyond historical tracing and linguistic interpretation of the word “witness,” it should be examined whether limiting the privilege to testimonial evidence
makes sense.
Justice Brennan opined that compelled polygraph examinations, which aim at
obtaining physical evidence, are actually designed to extract evidence that is essentially testimonial, and stated that a different conclusion would undermine the spirit
and history of the Fifth Amendment.435 Justice Black asserted that the distinction
between physical and communicative testimony is unreasonable.436 In fact, the message
that accompanies the very act of submitting documents is often marginal and uncontroversial, and what seems to trouble both accused persons and law enforcement
agencies is the content of these documents.437
The distinction between physical and testimonial evidence, and consequently
between active and passive cooperation, is challenged when physical measures are
used to discover the truth, such as polygraph, truth serum, and devices that read and
transmit thoughts.438 Neuroscientific evidence sometimes belongs to both
432
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categories.439 Current data technology and certainly future technological progress
blur the distinction between physical evidence and an individual’s mental knowledge and consciousness.440 The polygraph demonstrates the fragile boundaries
between speech and physical reactions. As stated, the United States Supreme Court
views forced polygraph tests as protected under the privilege against self-incrimination because, even though polygraphs measure physical performance, they are used
to extract testimonial responses.441 One article offers a hypothetical example that
demonstrates the polygraph’s ability to extract uncontrollable reactions from suspects
even in the face of their reluctance to cooperate.442 In the article’s example, while a
murder suspect is chained, a polygraph device is attached to his body, and the investigator asks him about various places where the body of a murdered girl was
suspected to be hidden.443 Observing the silent suspect’s physiological reactions, the
polygraph tester gradually narrows down the search areas and eventually leads the
investigators to the location of the body.444 DNA too can reveal a person’s most
intimate details and in the future may help detect character tendencies, including a
tendency toward violence or pedophilia.445 Scientific progress may allow, and perhaps
already allows, penetrating persons’ brains to read their thoughts.446 Thus, researchers are examining the ability to discover falsehoods using Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or other devices designed to extract the truth by examining the brains’ physiological responses.447
Some scholars contend that the privilege against self-incrimination protects
accused persons from extracting information from their minds.448 In the case of an
obligation to hand over documents, there is no attempt to extract information from
the mind. In United States v. Hubbell, the United States Supreme Court held that the
privilege applies because the obligation imposed on the defendant to submit documents by categories exploited the content of his mind.449 It is argued that the privilege against self-incrimination should allow persons to keep charge of their thoughts,
which make up their unique personality, and to exclude, for example, the use of brain
resonance devices to trace persons’ thoughts.450 Even if a reliable lie detector capable
cooperation); see also Theophilopoulos, supra note 222, at 120 (discussing new methods of
evidence gathering and the implication of these technologies on cooperation).
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of reading thoughts is developed, the privilege against self-incrimination should
protect accused persons from being forcibly subjected to it.451 Blood is not part of
our personality, but our thoughts definitely are.452 Accused persons should not be
denied control over their minds.453 Testimonies should be viewed as the substantial
content of human cognition, and hence the privilege against self-incrimination
should prevent coercive incrimination by means of a high degree of control over the
suspect’s mind.454 In fact, our personality is “infused” with data technology, which
significantly improves our memory and analytical functions.455 Therefore, the word
“mind” should be flexibly interpreted.456
Some define testimony as relying on the accused persons’ epistemic authority
over the contents of mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, hopes, concerns, and
knowledge.457 It is alleged that a suspect such as Hubbell is an epistemic authority,458
but an accused person is not an epistemic authority as to the question of the correspondence between his or her handwriting and voice and the offender’s handwriting
and voice.459 It is, however, easy to see that this distinction is not simple, either,
because a suspect is an epistemic authority on whether a particular sample is their
handwriting or voice.460 Suspects are also epistemic authorities over the relationship
between the requested documents and the documents they provide. Additionally,
borderline cases can also arise under the epistemic test. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court excluded a response of an intoxicated suspect (“I don’t know”) to
the question of when his sixth birthday occurred.461 The Court held that the suspect
could have chosen between a true and a false answer indicating a certain date.462 The
dissenting opinion in this case stated that the suspect was not given a real choice,
just as a person who is unable to read the letters during an eye examination does not
(discussing competing theories of the mind/body distinction). But see Pardo, supra note 260,
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451
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face a real possibility of offering a reasonable answer.463 In any case, there is no
practical meaning to providing a false answer, which can improve the individual’s
situation.464 Indeed, some posit that the defendant’s reply about his sixth birthday
is not subject to change or manipulation and therefore should not enjoy the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.465 According to another view, that
statement should not have been protected by the privilege because it did not draw
information from the cognition.466 It was also held that both the speech and the
failure of memory had been affected by alcohol consumption.467
At any rate, those who are troubled by the situation in which the authorities
view themselves empowered to access the content of our minds—which includes
thoughts, beliefs, and emotions—seek to redefine the ambit of the privilege against
self-incrimination468 or, at the very least, to set forth explicit rules for limiting the
power of the government to enter our minds.469
It can simply be stated that an examination that purports to read our thoughts is
protected by the privilege. The result of such an examination is testimonial because
it reflects the accused person’s thoughts, feelings, and beliefs in relation to the
offense attributed to him or her.470
Still, we should remember that witnesses who are not suspected or charged with
an offense have no right to control their thoughts when required to give evidence
that may embarrass them but does not criminally implicate them or a person close
to them in a crime.471 In addition, eavesdropping or lawful searches of computers
and mobile phones also force accused persons, without their knowledge and contrary
to their will, to disclose their thoughts, beliefs, concerns, and other feelings to law
enforcement agencies.
However, accused persons should be protected by the privilege against selfincrimination from their compulsion to accept the investigation and trial against them
as if they are slaves of the state. As Professor Louis Seidman justifiably observes,
persons can be punished, but cannot be forced to concede to their punishment.472
463
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Indeed, the privilege against self-incrimination protects accused persons from
the inhibition of their free choice. Reading of thoughts cannot therefore be equated
with mere observation of accused persons, for example, for a psychiatric evaluation.473
Persons have control over their behavior. One can avoid speaking with another
person about the offense he had committed and thus be protected from the gathering
of incriminating evidence through eavesdropping. Persons can conceal weapons or
proceeds of a crime and thus protect themselves from their seizure during a search.
It is doubtful whether they have control over their thoughts, though it can be argued
that control of thoughts is possible and can be learned. At any rate, on the assumption that mind control is impossible, it is argued that accused persons face no choice
and hence no trilemma. They are clearly forced to furnish information.474 But this
compulsion to provide evidence does infringe on their freedom of choice. It is their
freedom of action that is violated, not their freedom of will.
If the privilege against self-incrimination is extended to protect accused persons
from inhibiting their free choice, one may wonder whether law enforcement agencies
may not be allowed to require suspects to lift their shirt sleeves to check the existence
of wounds in their arms or to take off their clothes to check marks on their bodies.
Even vehement proponents of due process would find it hard to justify such results.
Some assert that in striking the appropriate balance between the necessities of
law enforcement and the preservation of individuals’ rights, the state’s interest is
stronger regarding the requirement to submit documents than the requirement to
make statements.475 Extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to cover
physical examinations and submission of documents might intolerably frustrate the
ability of law enforcement agencies to enforce the law.476 It is argued that denying
law enforcement agencies the right to require cooperation from accused persons is
impractical in terms of the necessities of law enforcement and the state’s regulatory
role to maintain public safety477 and that the freedom of choice cannot therefore be
the dominant reason underlying the privilege against self-incrimination.478 The
473
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testimonial component constitutes a “pragmatic compromise” between the justifications underpinning the privilege against self-incrimination and law enforcement
agencies’ interest in gathering evidence and pursuing the truth.479
But even if practical reasons advocate allowing certain types of searches and
examinations that can be performed without penetrating the body or gleaning information from the mind, the result is nonetheless a violation of the privilege to some
extent. As this Article demonstrated, there is no valid distinction between active and
passive cooperation in terms of the freedom of will.
Scholars opine that the refusal to speak conveys a message.480 In fact, any refusal
to cooperate conveys a communicative message regarding the will of the accused
to be left alone and to insist on the principle according to which the burden of proof
lies with the prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The privilege against self-incrimination does not rest only on the concern for the
reliability of the evidence. To the extent that non-epistemic justifications underpin
the privilege against self-incrimination and that the central reason for the privilege
rests on the state’s burden of proof and the autonomy and free will of an accused
person to choose his or her defense, the privilege should also apply to compelled
physical examinations and submission of documents.481
Clearly the privilege against self-incrimination does not completely preclude
using accused persons to establish guilt. Guilt is sometimes proven by lawful eavesdropping, physical evidence left at the scene of the crime, voluntary confessions,
and failure to cope with cross-examination at trial.
The privilege against self-incrimination does not protect accused persons from
the state’s unilateral gathering of incriminating evidence. It should, however, protect
them from the obligation to cooperate with law enforcement agencies that inhibit
479
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their free choice, deny them the option of behaving passively, and turn them into
tools under law enforcement agencies’ control.
Associating the burden imposed on the state to prove guilt as a condition for
securing convictions with the privilege against self-incrimination requires the extension of the privilege’s ambit to include a ban on forcing accused persons to cooperate
with law enforcement agencies.
Neuroscience negates the distinction between the body and the mind and unequivocally points to the reciprocity of body and mind.482 Individuals’ bodies and
documents are part of their personalities.483 There is a close connection between
bending persons’ bodies and bending their wills. Obliging accused persons to hand
over documents or expose their bodies to examinations impairs their autonomy to
decide on the extent of their cooperation with law enforcement agencies.484
Accused persons have a right to be protected from having their will bent. They
have a right to think or to say: “I am not playing this game. You believe I am guilty
and may violate my rights through eavesdropping and detention, but you may not
inhibit my free will and force me to cooperate with you.”
Accused persons may shape their defense by controlling their physical reactions
and their statements. Currently, the state cannot read our thoughts and extract memories
to a degree of perfect accuracy.485 If an instrument capable of distinguishing between
truth and falsehood is invented, resembling the biblical God,486 the rules of evidence
would probably become irrelevant. It is likely that if the prospects of conviction and
punishment become certain, people would almost completely stop committing
crimes.487 Humanity is not there yet.
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